Can a Magisk-rooted phone pass Play Integrity?
Short answer: a rooted phone can usually get the BASIC verdict, and on Android 13 and newer it can't honestly get DEVICE or STRONG, because those need hardware proof of a locked bootloader. This guide explains each verdict, what changes with the Android version, what the common tools really do, and why results change without warning.
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The verdicts
An app that uses Play Integrity asks Google about the device and gets back a list of labels. Google decides on its servers. On Android 13 and newer, every label is based on hardware-backed signals from Android's key attestation, so it reflects what the phone's secure hardware reports about the bootloader, not what the software claims.
The device verdict ladder
Strongest label at the top. A phone gets every label whose conditions it meets.
-
MEETS_STRONG_INTEGRITYDEVICE, plus security updates in the last year for all partitionsOpt-inRooted: no -
MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITYHardware-backed proof of a locked bootloader and a certified OEM imageDefaultRooted: no -
MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITYBootloader locked or unlocked; needs key attestation with Google's root of trustOpt-inRooted: usually -
No labelSigns of attack such as API hooking, or of system compromise such as root
- Default vs opt-in: by default an app receives only
MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITYor an empty verdict. BASIC and STRONG are optional labels the app has to opt in to. In practice many apps simply check DEVICE. - BASIC on a rooted phone: Google's documentation says "rooted devices are eligible to return
meets-basic-integrityso long as key attestation is present." - DEVICE on a rooted phone (Android 13+): it needs "hardware-backed proof that the device bootloader is locked". Unlocking the bootloader, which installing Magisk requires, fails this by design. No module can make the phone's hardware report a locked bootloader.
- Licensed apps only: on Android 13 and newer, BASIC and STRONG are returned only to apps installed or updated by Google Play.
- Other signals: apps can also opt in to the Play licence status, the Play Protect status, recent device activity, and whether apps that can capture or control the screen are running. None of these are about root as such.
Android 12 and lower vs Android 13 and newer
The Android version the phone runs changes the rules. Google says Play Integrity was only "partially using hardware-backed security signals on Android 12 and lower". On those versions the device verdict could still be influenced by what software reported, which is why property-spoofing modules such as PlayIntegrityFork target it. From Android 13, the hardware decides.
What a phone can get, by Android version
| Feature | Stock, locked | Rooted, Android 12 or lower | Rooted, Android 13+ |
|---|---|---|---|
| BASIC | Yes | PartlyIf integrity checks don't see root | PartlyGoogle: rooted phones eligible |
| DEVICE | Yes | PartlyWhat PlayIntegrityFork targets | NoNeeds a locked bootloader |
| STRONG | Partly13+: update in the last year | NoNeeds hardware boot proof | No |
| Wallet tap to pay | Yes | NoGoogle: not supported | NoGoogle: not supported |
Two notes on the grid. On Android 12 and lower, STRONG "only requires hardware-backed proof of boot integrity" and no recent security update, so Google recommends apps also check the SDK version. And the PlayIntegrityFork README says Google Wallet checks the older verdict in the background even on Android 13+ phones, which is why the module still matters to some Wallet users despite Google's position.
What this means for your apps
- Apps that opted in and accept BASIC generally work after root, as long as they don't also run their own root detection.
- Apps that need DEVICE or STRONG on Android 13+, which includes many payment and banking apps, will fail on an unlocked phone whatever you install.
- Apps with their own checks look for the Magisk app,
suor modified files. That is a separate layer from Play Integrity, covered in banking apps that detect root.
What the common tools do
| Tool | What it does for integrity |
|---|---|
| Zygisk (built into Magisk) | Runs module code inside app processes. Integrity and hiding modules require it. On its own it changes no verdict. |
| DenyList (built into Magisk) | Reverts Magisk's changes in the apps you select when Enforce DenyList is on. It affects the app's own checks, not Google's verdict. |
| PlayIntegrityFork or PIF inject-s | Spoof device properties to Google Play services. PlayIntegrityFork's README says it fixes DEVICE for the Android <13 verdict and still helps with Google Wallet and Messages RCS on newer Android, but not the Android 13+ DEVICE verdict. |
| Tricky Store, Tricky Store OSS, TEESimulator | Replace the phone's attestation certificate chain with one from a hardware "keybox". Without a valid, unrevoked keybox they do nothing for Android 13+ DEVICE or STRONG. |
| Shamiko and similar hiding modules | Hide root from apps on the DenyList. They address the app's own checks, not hardware attestation. |
Methods that report DEVICE or STRONG on an unlocked phone present someone else's hardware attestation key, usually a leaked OEM keybox. Google says leaked keys are added to its revocation list, "typically" within several days of discovery, and that leaks don't affect keys from Remote Key Provisioning, the only kind used by phones that launched with Android 16. On October 16, 2026 the PixelOS project reported that devices without Remote Key Provisioning now pass BASIC only, whatever keybox or fingerprint is used. This site does not explain how to use leaked keys.
Why results keep changing
Play Integrity is decided on Google's servers, so a setup that passes today can fail tomorrow with nothing changed on your phone. The direction has been the same for two years:
How the rules have tightened
- Google announces new verdictsAndroid 13+ verdicts move to hardware-backed signals (key attestation). Opt-in at first.
- New verdicts for every appAll integrations switch over. DEVICE now needs a locked bootloader on Android 13+.
- Android 16: RKP onlyPhones launching with Android 16 use only Remotely Provisioned keys, which leaked factory keyboxes don't affect.
- PixelOS: BASIC only without RKPServer-side change: devices without Remote Key Provisioning pass BASIC only, whatever keybox is used.
What to do
- Decide what you need. If an app only needs BASIC or the older verdict, follow the Play Integrity Fix setup: Zygisk on, one PIF module, Google Play services not on the DenyList.
- Handle the app's own root checks separately, with the DenyList and the steps in banking apps that detect root.
- Check the result with a checker app installed from the Play Store, and accept it. If DEVICE fails on Android 13+, that is expected with an unlocked bootloader.
- If a must-have app needs DEVICE or STRONG, the only reliable route is a locked bootloader on unmodified, certified firmware: keep that app on an unrooted phone, or unroot and relock. Read how to uninstall Magisk first, because relocking with modified firmware can make a phone unbootable.
Questions people ask
Why does my integrity checker app show fewer labels than expected?
On Android 13 and newer, Google returns the optional BASIC and STRONG labels only when the requesting app is licensed, meaning it was installed or updated by Google Play. A checker you sideloaded can therefore show no BASIC label even when the phone would get one. Use a checker installed from the Play Store.
Does Magisk itself do anything for Play Integrity?
No. Magisk's FAQ says it no longer handles root hiding and leaves that to modules. Magisk provides Zygisk, which integrity modules need, and the DenyList, which reverts Magisk's changes for selected apps.
PlayIntegrityFork is installed but DEVICE still fails. Is it broken?
On Android 13 or newer, that is expected. Its README describes the module as fixing the device verdict "for the Android <13" verdict, and says the Android 13+ verdict "relies on locked bootloader checks to pass even DEVICE integrity." Setup and troubleshooting are on the Play Integrity Fix page.
Even BASIC fails. What now?
Start with the PlayIntegrityFork README's advice: disable every module except the integrity module, reboot and test again. Make sure Google Play services is not on the DenyList while Enforce DenyList is on. If you use a custom ROM or kernel, the README says its signing keys or kernel name can also cause failures.
Can I use Google Wallet tap to pay on a rooted phone?
Not as a supported setup. Google's Wallet help says Wallet doesn't run on phones that are rooted or have an unlocked bootloader, and that you must reinstall the phone's original operating system for contactless payments. The PlayIntegrityFork README describes steps that help some users, but they can stop working at any time.
Will relocking the bootloader give me DEVICE again?
With stock, certified firmware, yes: DEVICE is about a locked bootloader running a certified manufacturer image. Relocking while Magisk or other modified images are still installed can make the phone unbootable. Unroot first, following relocking the bootloader.
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Sources
This page is written from the sources below. If anything here disagrees with them, the upstream source is correct.
- Play Integrity API: integrity verdicts (Android Developers)
- Play Integrity API: hardware-backed verdict improvements (Android Developers)
- Making the Play Integrity API faster, more resilient, and more private (Android Developers Blog, December 2024)
- Key and ID attestation: revocation and Remote Key Provisioning (Android Developers)
- Fix problems with tap to pay transactions (Google Wallet Help)
- PlayIntegrityFork README (osm0sis)
- PixelOS user guide: Play Integrity notice, October 16, 2026
- Magisk FAQ (topjohnwu)
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